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into an adversary-in-the-making  The mixture of 
mercantilism and messianism that is at the core of 
the Kremlin’s new foreign policy frightens Europe 
Putin’s new assertive foreign policy, expressed 
most powerfully in the Russian President’s speech 
last February at the Munich Security Conference, 
rests on two key assumptions and one strategic 
calculation  The first assumption is that the United 
States’ global hegemony is unsustainable and 
the decline of American power is irreversible  
Russians are tempted to view the current crisis of 
America’s global power as an analogy alongside 
the crisis of Soviet power of the 1980s  The 
Russian media views the debacle in Iraq as 
“America’s Afghanistan ” Washington’s conflicts 
with its European allies in the aftermath of the 
American invasion in Iraq are conceptualized 
as the dismantling of the informal American 
empire in Europe  The recent U S  mortgage 
and banking crisis is seen as a signal of the 
fundamental weakness of the American economy  
The second assumption is that the European Union 
is a threat to Russian interests by way of its very 
existence as a post-modern empire  In Russia’s 
view, however, the European Union is a temporary 
phenomenon exactly because of its post-modern 
nature  Russia’s European strategy is based on 
the expectation that sovereign nation-states will 
determine Europe’s future  This explains Moscow’s 
stress on bilateral relations with big European 
member states and its growing reluctance to deal 
with the European Union  In the early years of 
his presidency, Vladimir Putin tended to view the 
European Union as a benevolent competitor and 
a strategic ally in Moscow’s desire for a multipolar 
world  But the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
became Russia’s 9/11; it had a revolutionary impact 
on Russia’s foreign policy thinking  Moscow 
realized that the European Union is the only great 
power with unsettled borders and that the urge to 
expand its principles and institutions are built into 
Introduction1
Post-Cold War Europe is history  In less than a 
decade, and powered by the soaring price of oil, 
President Vladimir Putin has turned Russia into a 
powerful international player  Russia’s reliance on 
Western credits has turned into Europe’s reliance on 
Russian gas  Russia’s military budget has increased 
six-fold since the beginning of the century, and 
Russia’s intelligence networks have penetrated 
all corners of Europe  Russia has regained its 
influence in Central Asia, and it has established 
strategic cooperation with China in the framework 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
The general mood in Moscow these days is that 
“Russia is up, America is down, and Europe is 
out  Russia, previously a Pluto in the Western 
solar system, has spun out of its orbit, powered 
by the determination to find its own system ”1 
The rhetoric of EU–Russia cooperation and 
partnership cannot mask the fact that mutual 
suspicion, misperception, frustration, and paranoia 
are starting to determine the dynamics of the 
relationship between Russia and the European 
Union  Russia’s opposition to the West-sponsored 
independence of Kosovo and to the proposed 
installation of an American anti-missile defense 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic on 
the one hand, and Brussels’ growing concerns 
about Russia’s aggressive energy policy in Europe 
on the other, have poisoned the relationship by 
bringing back memories of the Cold War  “The 
Soviet Union was easier to deal with than Russia 
is today,” observed a senior French diplomat  
“Sometimes the Soviets were difficult, but you 
knew they were being obstructive in order to 
achieve an objective  Now Russia seeks to block the 
West systematically on every subject, apparently 
without a purpose ”2 In the eyes of the West, 
Russia has turned from a partner-in-the-making 
1  Dmitri V  Trenin, “Getting Russia Right,” Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2007 
2  Quoted after Charles Grant, “A new deal with Russia?,”  
Prospect Magazine, November 2007 
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new foreign 
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new foreign policy 
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the Russian elite 
and the Russian 
society at large.
overshadowed by the rise of China and Moscow 
will remain an “economy class” great power  
In this sense, Russia’s newfound taste for 
confrontation with the West is not an emotional 
overreaction or theatrical grandstanding—it is 
a strategic choice  The Kremlin’s new foreign 
policy is not circumstantial in nature  It is the 
expression of a new foreign policy consensus 
within the Russian elite and the Russian society 
at large  The change of personalities inside the 
Kremlin is unlikely to change this consensus 
the European project  In response to the explosion 
of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine 
and America’s endorsement of regime change 
as a legitimate policy objective, Putin adopted 
the concept of sovereign democracy—security 
understood as absolute sovereignty—as the less 
interference from the outside, the safer you are  
Moscow’s strategic calculation is that “the West 
is losing its monopoly on the globalization 
processes,”3 and the next decade presents a 
window of opportunity for restoring Russia’s 
global influence  Otherwise Russia will be 
3  Sergei Karaganov, “A New Epoch of Confrontation,” Russia in 
Global Affairs № 4, October–December 2007 
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The Exceptionalism  
of the European Union2
“What came to an end in 1989,” wrote British 
diplomat Robert Cooper, summarizing Europe’s 
consensus, “was not just the Cold War or even 
the Second World War  What came to an end 
in Europe (but perhaps only in Europe) were 
the political systems of three centuries: the 
balance of power and the imperial urge ” 4 
The European policy elite assumed that the end 
of the Cold War meant the emergence of a new 
European order  The key elements of this post-
modern European order were thought to be a 
highly developed system of mutual interference 
in each other’s domestic affairs and security based 
on openness and transparency  The post-modern 
system does not rely on a balance of power; nor 
does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation 
of domestic and foreign affairs  It rejects the use 
of force as an instrument for settling conflicts 
and promotes increased mutual dependence 
between European states  The construction of 
the common European legal space, based on 
the priority of human rights institutionalized in 
the European Convention on Human Rights, is 
the embodiment of post-Cold War Europe  The 
essence of this order is the gradual transformation 
of the traditional European nation-state into an 
EU member state or an EU-compatible state  
Brussels’ view on the interaction between the 
post-modern European order and American 
global hegemony has always been a mixture of 
ambiguity and hypocrisy  European policy elites 
were openly opposing America’s unipolar world, 
advocating multilateralism and even multi-
polarity  At the same time, the EU project relied 
on the United States’ security umbrella in Europe 
and on America’s global hegemony  The tension 
between the EU’s post-modernism and the U S ’s 
enlightened modernism was one of the reasons for 
the transatlantic crisis in 2003  The United States 
has tolerated the EU’s exceptionalism regardless    
4  Robert Cooper, “The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in 
the Twenty-First Century,” London: Atlantic Books, 2003 
In its “Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations,” the 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) 
nervously stated that “Russia has emerged as 
the most divisive issue in the European Union ” 
Moscow has succeeded in splitting EU member 
states into “Trojan horses,” “new cold warriors,” 
“strategic partners,” and friendly and frosty 
pragmatists  It has also provoked a clash between 
European business elites (Russia-friendly) and 
political and security elites (Russia-nervous)  
It has eroded EU consensus  In the view of the 
ECFR, Russia is “setting itself up as an ideological 
alternative to the European Union, with a different 
approach to sovereignty, power, and world order ”5
Three Russian decisions marked the end of the 
post-Cold War European order: withdrawal from 
the Treaty of Conventional Forces; deliberate 
efforts to block the work of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
in the field of election monitoring; and refusal 
to ratify the Reform of the European Court on 
Human Rights, Protocol No  14 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights  It is clear that Russia 
and the European Union have opposing views on 
the nature of the post-Cold War European order 
and on the sources of instability in Eurasia  
Russia was not a post-modern state in the 1990s, 
but part of the post-modern European order  The 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the 
OSCE (based on intrusive inspections and active 
monitoring), and Russia’s membership in the 
Council of Europe were the major instruments for 
integrating Russia into the post-modern system  
They made Russia look as if it had accepted 
the post-modern imperatives of openness and 
interdependency while still suffering from 
disfunctionality and an identity crisis  Russia’s 
weakness has created the illusion that Moscow 
ideologically subscribes to the post-Cold War 
order in Europe  The reality turned out to be 
5 http://www ecfr eu/content/entry/eu_russia_relations
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very different  As soon as it had an opportunity, 
Moscow chose to part with post-modernity 
and built its statehood according to European 
practices and ideologies of the 19th century rather 
than the European ideas of the 21st century  
The European illusion that Russia can be a 
partner of the European Union in its struggle for 
a multipolar world based on international law 
is dead  For Moscow, support of multilateralism 
and the advocacy of a multipolar world were 
simply tactical weapons for contesting American 
hegemony  In reality, Russia’s foreign policy 
instincts are more “American” than European  
Russia believes in power, unilateralism, and an 
unrestrained pursuit of national interest  From 
the Kremlin’s point of view, sovereignty is not 
a right; its meaning is not a seat in the United 
Nations  For the Kremlin, sovereignty is a capacity  
It implies economic independence, military 
strength, and cultural identity  In the Kremlin’s 
vocabulary, sovereign power is a synonym for great 
power  While the European Union was founded 
as a response to the perils of nationalism and the 
catastrophic rivalries of European nation-states in 
the first half of the 20th century, Russia’s current 
foreign policy thinking is shaped by the perils of 
the post-national politics and the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union  European nightmares are rooted 
in the experience of the 1930s  Russia’s nightmares 
are shaped by the Russian experience of the 1980s 
and 1990s  The European Union views the lack 
of democracy as a major source of instability 
in Eurasia  Russia views weak democracies and 
the Western policy of exporting democracy as 
the major source of instability in the post-Soviet 
space  The clash between these contrasting 
views of the European order was unavoidable   
At present, Russia’s view of the European order 
is a mixture of nostalgia for the time of the 
“concert of Europe” and envy of today’s China, 
which is managing to balance the economic 
opening to the West with rejection of any Western 
interference in its domestic politics  The Kremlin-
sponsored ideology of sovereign democracy is 
meant to integrate Russia into the world economy 
while at the same time preventing any foreign 
interference in Russia’s domestic politics  
Putin’s Russia is not a pedestrian authoritarian 
state and it is not the “paperback edition” of the 
Soviet Union  Putin’s Russia is a controversial 
project that combines the gains of Russia’s capitalist 
revolution and the fears of democratic politics 
that shapes Russian political tradition  The 
communist one-party state has been replaced by 
Putin’s one-pipeline state  Putin offered to Russian 
society consumer rights but not political rights, 
elections but not popular control of power, and 
state sovereignty but not individual autonomy  
Putin’s sovereign democracy model has succeeded 
to secure political stability, but it has failed to create 
a stable political system  Putin can speak and act 
for Russia to an extent that is rare in the history 
of the world  However, the cohabitation of Putin’s 
hand-picked successor Dimitri Medvedev (to 
be elected President shortly after this writing, in 
March 2008), and Vladimir Putin himself (in the 
dual role of Prime Minister and a national leader) 
may turn out to be less harmonious than the 
succession strategists expect  In Russia, the transfer 
of power has always been also about redistribution 
of property  The existence of two centers of power 
at the heart of the Russian political system makes 
the regime profoundly unstable  In Putin’s own 
words, “centralized power is in Russia’s DNA ”
Russia is both a rising global power and a weak state 
with corrupt and inefficient institutions  Putin’s 
Russia is more democratic but less predictable 
and reliable than the Soviet Union  Putin’s 
regime seems rock solid and at the same time 
extremely vulnerable  Russia’s economic growth 
looks both impressive and unsustainable  The 
more capitalist and Westernized Russia becomes, 
the more anti-Western its policies become  
Putin’s sovereign 
democracy model 
has succeeded to 
secure political 
stability, but it 
has failed to 
create a stable 
political system.
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At present, Western policymakers are oscillating 
between their desire to speak tough and teach 
Russia a lesson, and the realization that the 
West has lost most of its leverage over Russia  
The West’s strategy in Russia is lost in the 
controversy between those who want to contain 
Russia and those who want to engage Russia  
Unfortunately “containment” and “engagement” 
are policy slogans and not effective strategies 
What exactly is the West preparing itself to 
contain—Russia’s ideology, Russia’s anticipated 
territorial expansion, or Russia’s economic presence 
in Europe? Containing its ideology will be tricky 
because Putin does not present a coherent ideology 
for export  Sovereign democracy, while attractive 
to some postcommunist elites and societies, is 
primarily a defensive weapon  At the core of 
Moscow’s soft power today is not the attraction 
of Putinism as an ideology, but the oil money and 
the corruption of Russian companies  Containing 
Russia’s territorial aspirations would also be a 
misguided objective  Russia’s foreign policy (unlike 
the Soviet one) is not obsessed with territory  
Moscow is not dreaming about restoring its 
territorial empire  What the Kremlin is interested 
in is control over the energy infrastructure in 
post-Soviet states and the neutralization of 
Western influence  When it comes to Russia’s 
economic presence in Europe, the notion of 
“containment” confronts the very logic of the free 
market on which the West was founded  The cost 
of anti-Russian protectionism in the European 
Union will be the slowing of growth in Europe  
Unlike the Soviet Union, which was determined 
to destroy capitalism, Putin’s Kremlin is in the 
business of exploiting and enjoying it  Russia has 
become “undeniably capitalist, relatively open, 
and reasonably integrated in the world ”6 The 
economic containment of Russia will be forcefully 
opposed by Europe’s business community and by 
European consumers  In short, containment is 
6 Dmitri V  Trenin, “Getting Russia Right,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2007 
not a policy option that will work  It is a rhetorical 
figure or, as Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov likes 
to claim, containing Russia is a mentality 7 
“Engagement” is also nothing more than a policy 
slogan  It is easy to agree that Russia and the 
West share strategic interests  The West needs 
Russia’s cooperation in dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions, in fighting international terrorism, 
and in managing the rise of Asia  Russia needs 
the West for its technological and institutional 
modernization  But a policy of engagement 
defined as a focus on national interest, and a 
radical turn from value-based foreign policy to 
19th century Realpolitik, is not a workable option 
for today’s relations between Russia and the West  
The advocates of a “grand bargain” between 
Russia and the West fail to take into consideration 
the peculiar nature of the European Union as a 
global policy player  While the United States is an 
ideological power by choice, the European Union 
is an ideological power by its very nature  As 
reknowned historian and political scientist George 
Kennan said of “the political personality” of Soviet 
power, the EU’s power also “as we know it today 
is the product of ideology and circumstances ”8 
At the moment when the European Union shifts 
to traditional 19th century-style Realpolitik, the 
common EU foreign policy is not imaginable 
anymore  A grand bargain with Russia would 
result in the re-nationalization of the big EU 
member states’ foreign policies and will destroy 
the hope of a common European foreign policy 
In short, the West is facing an unhappy choice  
Sticking to the policy rationale of the 1990s risks 
an escalation in its confrontation with Russia; 
however, breaking with that policy rationale 
threatens the relevance of the European Union 
7 Sergei Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to the Future?”, Russia 
in Global Affairs. No  4, October–December 2007 
8 Cf : George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (1947), 
“The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is 
the product of ideology and circumstances.”
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as a global policy player  The West should decide 
how to treat Russia—as a rising global power or as 
a declining great power that enjoys a temporary 
rise thanks to the high price of oil  Treating Russia 
as a declining power is seductive but dangerous  
Treating Russia as an effective authoritarian state 
will be a mistake  Putin’s regime is less stable and 
more ineffective than most observers believe  
The hope that Russia’s revisionism gives a new 
rationale for enlarging NATO and anchoring 
countries like Georgia and Ukraine to the West 
is also illusory  In the long-term, Putin’s Russia 
cannot play the role once played by the Soviet 
Union, and making NATO and EU enlargement 
the West’s principal and only strategy could also 
backfire  Such a strategy overestimates the EU’s 
and NATO’s transformational power  The recent 
developments in the Balkans demonstrate that the 
soft power of the EU and NATO is in decline  It 
is also obvious that NATO and EU enlargements 
are not a panacea for weak states and divided 
societies  The adoption of a strategy of further 
NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet space risks 
importing instability into the European Union and 
NATO instead of exporting stability into Eurasia  
Secondly, the EU and the United States view 
Russia differently  For the United States, Russia 
is primarily a global power and Washington is 
interested in Moscow’s cooperation in sustaining 
the global order  For the European Union, Russia 
is first and foremost a European power  Brussels is 
interested in preserving the post-modern nature 
of the European order  A common transatlantic 
strategy is viewed as desirable by both the 
Unied States and the European Union, but it 
will be extremely difficult to achieve  While U S  
policymakers can decide to build their relationship 
with Russia primarily around cooperation in the 
field of nonproliferation and counterterrorism, this 
is not a strategy option for the European Union  
The real source of confrontation between Russia 
and the European Union today is not primarily 
rival interests or unshared values; it is political 
incompatibility  Russia’s challenge to the European 
Union cannot be reduced to the issue of energy 
dependency and Moscow’s ambition to dominate 
its “near abroad” that happens to be the EU’s 
“new neighborhood ” At the heart of the current 
crisis is not the clash between democracy and 
authoritarianism—history demonstrates that 
democratic and authoritarian states can easily 
cooperate—but the clash between the post-modern 
state embodied by the European Union and the 
traditional modern state embodied by Russia  
The European Union, with its emphases on human 
rights and openness, threatens the Kremlin’s 
“sovereign democracy” project  Russia’s insistence 
on balance of power and mercantilist geopolitical 
hardball stimulates the re-nationalization of the 
foreign policy of EU member states  In Moscow, 
the EU’s policy of democracy promotion awakens 
the nightmare of ethnic and religious politics and 
the threat of territorial disintegration of the Russian 
Federation  At the same time, faced with the 
invasion of Russian state-minded companies, EU 
member states are tempted to “ring-fence” certain 
sectors of their economies (such as domestic energy 
markets), thus threatening the liberal economic 
order that is at the center of the European project  
Russia, on the other hand, feels threatened by the 
invasion of Western-funded nongovernmental 
organizations  The Kremlin is tempted to re-
create the police state in order to prevent foreign 
interference in its domestic politics  Brussels is ready 
to endorse the Central Asian autocrats in order to 
limit its dependence on Russian gas  In short, what 
threatens Europe today is not mutually destructive 
nuclear war, but mutual destabilization of Russia 
and the European Union that could result in the 
marginalization of Europe in global politics  
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The immediate post-Cold War period was an 
exceptional and admirable decade in European 
history  It expanded the frontiers of freedom 
and democracy and made the reunification of 
Europe possible  Today, we face a completely 
different reality  While the capitalist revolution has 
triumphed, the democratic revolution is in retreat  
The U S -dominated unipolar world is in crisis and 
the European Union has lost some of its ability to 
shape realities in its own periphery  Both the United 
States and the European Union suffer from a 
profound crisis of self-confidence  Many societies in 
the world have second thoughts about democratic 
revolutions and the export of democracy  EU 
expansion is on hold because the European publics 
are less and less enthusiastic about new rounds 
of enlargement  The United States and NATO 
have lost prestige and legitimacy in the context of 
the Iraq war and the operation in Afghanistan  
In short, the policies of the 1990s were possible 
in the 1990s  Continuing the policies of 1990s in 
this new context creates grounds for reintroducing 
the sphere-of-influence politics in Europe rather 
than expanding the borders of democracy  The 
re-emergence of two blocs in Europe should 
not be an objective of EU foreign policy  
Breaking with the policies of the 1990s also presents 
a risk  There is a growing consensus today that the 
West made a strategic mistake taking advantage 
of Russia’s weakness in the 1990s and treating 
Russia as a defeated enemy instead of treating it as 
a transformed enemy 9 But the claim that Russia’s 
current foreign policy is simply a reaction or 
overreaction to the Western policies of the 1990s 
is unconvincing  It serves to justify Putin’s policies 
and not to explain them  Ronald Asmus, executive 
director of the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels 
office and former U S  deputy assistant secretary of 
9  Dimitri K  Simes, “Losing Russia  The Costs of Renewed Con-
frontation,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007  
state for European affairs, is correct to insist that 
“had NATO and the European Union not acted 
in the 1990s, Europe today would be messier, less 
stable, and a more inward-looking place ”10 The 
concessions of the European Union and the United 
States to Putin’s Russia could be read as a sign of 
weakness and not a sign of good will  Countries like 
Ukraine and Georgia are legitimately concerned 
that a “Russia first policy” could be detrimental 
to their political and economic development   
EU policy toward Russia should start with the 
recognition that Russia will remain a global player 
during the next decade  At the same time, it is 
unlikely that Russia will become a mature liberal 
democracy during that period  The European 
Union should also recognize that for Moscow “the 
result of the policy of integration with the West 
in the 1990s was the establishment of external 
control over Russian resources; the construction 
of European and global security systems patterned 
after NATO and without Russia’s participation in it; 
and continuous loss of Russia’s influence in the area 
of its strategic interests (former Soviet republics) ”11 
So, Russia has legitimate concerns about the 
asymmetrical impact of the end of the Cold War on 
its security  Russia felt betrayed in its expectations 
that the end of the Cold War would mean 
demilitarization of Central and Eastern Europe  
And while NATO enlargement did not bring any 
real security threats to Russia, it has changed the 
military balance between Russia and the West 
and it has fueled Moscow’s revisionism  Russia 
has legitimate reasons to suspect that the West’s 
policy of democracy promotion is more interested 
in promoting Western foreign policy objectives 
than in strengthening democratic institutions  
10  Ronald D  Asmus, “Europe’s Eastern Promise  Rethinking 
NATO and EU Enlargement,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 
2008  
11  Konstantin Kosachev, “Russia and the West: Where the Diffe-
rences Lie,” Russia in Global Affairs  No  4, October–December 
2007 
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Western “blessing” for the bombing of the Russian 
parliament in 1993 and Western endorsement of the 
“free and fair” re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 
have given democracy promotion a dubious name   
What the European Union and the United States 
can offer Russia today is not a “grand bargain,” 
but an opportunity for reinventing the post-Cold 
War European order  Tradeoffs like Kosovo’s 
independence for non-installation of America’s 
anti-missile defense shield in Poland and the 
Czech Republic will not work  The European 
Union should focus on establishing institutional 
foundations for the co-existence of a post-modern 
empire-in-progress in the Western part of the 
continent, and a post-imperial nation-state-in-
progress in Russia  Both projects are internally 
controversial and fragile  The world does not know 
a state structure similar to the present European 
Union and the world has never known a Russian 
nation-state  It was Count Sergei Witte, prime 
minister under Nicholas II, who said that there was 
no such thing as Russia, but only a Russian empire  
The post-modern European order has emerged 
out of the ruins and in the shells of the Cold 
War institutions like the OSCE and the Treaty 
of Conventional Weapons  It was shaped by the 
EU’s Eastern enlargement and the understanding 
of the enlargement of the European Union as a 
reunification of Europe  From Brussels, there was 
no immediate pressure to re-invent the institutional 
foundation of the European order because EU 
enlargement was the institutional foundation of 
the new European order  Brussels was molding 
the new European order by transforming the 
economy and the political institutions on its 
periphery  The democratization of its neighbors 
was the EU’s common foreign policy  Brussels’ 
message to the former communist societies was 
that if you behave like us, you will become one 
of us  This is no longer true  The new reality in 
Europe is the emergence of a post-enlargement 
European Union and a resurgent Russia that 
presents itself as an alternative model to the EU  
Re-institutionalizing the European order is an 
imperative for taming confrontation between 
Moscow and Brussels and the only alternative to 
the re-emergence of spheres of influence in Europe  
The Western policy community presently rejects 
all of Russia’s attempts for renegotiating the Treaty 
on Conventional Weapons as well as the mandate 
and the agenda of the OSCE  The conventional 
wisdom is that the result of such renegotiations 
would be a retreat from the achievements of 
the 1990s  But how correct is this judgment?
The European Union cannot act as a fervent 
guardian of the post-Cold War status quo 
without risking a total collapse of the institutional 
infrastructure of post-Cold War Europe  In reality, 
it is in Brussels’ interest to take the initiative and to 
engage Russia in a dialogue over the institutional 
foundations of the shaken European order  The 
EU’s main objective in political terms should be 
to preserve the distinctive character of this order  
More so than the world at large, Europe today is 
founded on the centrality of human rights and the 
rule of law  This is something that Brussels should 
fight for and preserve  The EU’s main objective 
in institutional terms should be to center the 
institutions of the new European order around the 
European Union as a principal policy actor and 
not on its member states  The dueling nature of 
Russia’s regime—capitalist and non-democratic, 
European and anti-EU—and the finalization of 
EU institutional reforms suggest such a strategy  
The Kremlin is not rejecting any of the basic 
principles of the democratic West  Officially, it 
is not rejecting liberal democracy but trying to 
define its national model  The Kremlin is not 
officially rejecting the primacy of human rights 
and a rule-of-law based society, it is simply not 
practicing them  Moscow’s major complaint 
is not about the West’s standards, its about the 
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West’s double standards  What the European 
Union should make use of is the fact that the 
legitimacy of Russia’s current regime is based 
to a large extent on the perception that it is a 
regime that strives to bring Russia back into the 
European civilization  It is true that Russia does 
not dream of being part of the European Union 
any more  However, Russia’s stability depends on 
preserving the European nature of its regime  
It is not by accident that—unlike his Central Asian 
fellow-presidents—President Vladimir Putin 
decided to step out of office and let go of power 
after the end of his second term  The regime is 
doomed the moment the Russian elite loses its 
European legitimacy  This European dependence 
open an opportunity for the West to defend its 
principles in negotiating the new European order 
with Russia  Brussels should offer its own vision 
for the institutional framework of Europe  
The Lisbon treaty unblocked the EU reform agenda 
and allowed Brussels to concentrate on building an 
EU-centered European order that would guarantee 
the coexistence of the EU’s post-modern empire 
and post-imperial Russia without hurting the 
interests of third countries  The transformation 
of the Contact Group on Kosovo consisting of six 
countries (the United States, Russia, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) into the 
Troika Process consisting of the United States, 
Russia, and the European Union is the model for 
such a re-institutionalization of Europe  Creating 
institutional incentives for the EU’s unity would 
help Europe overcome the structural contradiction 
of the European project  The transformation 
of the OSCE into a political forum where EU 
member states will be individually represented by 
the European Union, for example, could be such 
an institutional innovation  If Russia’s strategy 
aims to erode the Union by focusing on bilateral 
relations with selected member states, Brussels’ 
priority should be to institutionalize the Union 
as Russia’s negotiating partner  Reinventing the 
European order will allow both the European 
Union to achieve this major objective and 
will create the institutional framework for 
cooperation and competition  Russia will secure 
non-interference in its domestic politics while 
the European Union will reinstitute a European 
order based on the rule of law and transparency 
We need a new European order that will not only 
allow the coexistence of a post-modern European 
Union and a post-imperial Russia, but allow for 
a co-existence based on the principles of the 
Council of Europe  The European Union and the 
United States cannot pretend any more that they 
have the legitimacy or the capacity to transform 
Russia into a liberal democracy in the coming 
decade  But the European Union should not allow 
Russia to send it into a benevolent irrelevance 
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